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In an earlier essay I have dealt with the intellect-will problem 
in the thought of Nicholas of Cuss.' In the present article I will 
treat the same question in the thought of three other Northern- 
Renaissance humanists: Colet, Erasmus, and Montaigne. Finally 
in my "Summary and Conclusion" at the end of this essay, I shall 
endeavor to draw some comparisons and contrasts covering all 
four of the men. 
1. John Colet 
Colet's View of Man's Nature 
John Colet (d. 1519), perhaps most famous as an English 
educator in Oxford and London, adhered to the Augustinian 
doctrine of original sin, involving inherited guilt and universal 
human depra~i ty .~  When Adam sinned the whole race sinned so 
that his descendants were born with depraved natures and per- 
verted intellects and wills, subject to the sentence of eternal death. 
Leland Miles suggests that Colet argued for a tendency to evil 
in fallen man with no "absolute obliteration of free will."3 Ernest 
Hunt quotes Colet to prove that his concept involved total 
depravity of reason and will in relation to spiritual matters: 
lSee AUSS 12 (July 1974): 83-93. The introductory section in that earlier 
essay (pp. 83-84) outlines more specifically the particular problem treated in 
both articles, and it may therefore be useful to reread that section as an 
introduction to the material being presented now. 
aLeland Miles, John Colet and the Platonic Tradition (La Salle, Ill., 1961), 
pp. 88-89. 
Ibid. 
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His fall is total: after the Fall "man had no whole and undefiled 
nature, no unclouded reason, no upright will. Whatever men did 
among themselves, was foolish and wicked." The whole of 
humanity has been corrupted by the Fall; the sequel of Adam's 
primal sin was "one long course of downfall, stumbling, error, 
and deception amongst men"; man was unable to "establish any- 
thing sure, anything holy, anything wholesome, anything to please 
God or benefit mankind"; the life, laws, customs, and deeds of 
mankind were polluted and foul.* 
In An Exposition of St. P a d s  Epistle to the Romans, Colet 
describes man as comprising "a sentient body'' and a soul or 
"inner man."5 Because of man's fallen condition the body, with its 
passions and desires, is in complete control of the soul. "From its 
violence and tyranny the soul, that is, the poor inner man, being 
weak and powerless by reason of Adam's unhappy fall, has been 
incapable, with all its efforts, of releasing and liberating it~elf.' '~ 
The soul consists of two parts: intelligence or heat, and will or 
light.' The "most excellent" part of the soul is the intellect.* 
In the absence of divine aid the will is unable to assume 
dominance over the clamorings of the body, and the intellect is 
unable to grasp any worthwhile knowledge of God. 
Colet's teaching of the bondage of the will before justification 
is based on the doctrine of single predestination (by contrast 
with double predestination). The sins of men are foreknown by 
God, but not predetermined by him. In respect to the damned, 
God's foreknowledge is distinct from his predetermination, so that 
he is in no way responsible for eviLg Colet did not assert, as 
Luther did, that all things, whether good or evil, happen of 
necessity.1° Rather, he urged that "God's foreknowledge and 
Ernest William Hunt, Dean Colet and His Theology (London, 1956), p. 11. 
John Colet, An Exposition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, trans. 
J .  H. Lupton (Farnborough, Hants., Eng., 1873, 1965), p. 16. Hereinafter 
referred to as Colet, Romans. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
Ibid., p. 72. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 5. 
Martin Luther, T h e  Bondage of the Will ,  trans. J .  I .  Packer and 0. R. 
Johnston (London, 1957), pp. 80-81. 
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truth" are not "the cause of sin being committed; nor is a sin, 
though foreknown, in any degree the cause of God's fore- 
knowledge appearing true."ll Unregenerate men have no power 
to choose goodness, much less to perform it; but they are, 
nonetheless, totally responsible for their depravity and ultimate 
ruin. 
In the case of the elect, on the other hand, Colet equates God's 
foreknowledge with his foreordination.12 The decision to deliver 
them from bondage to the sentient body, so that the soul (in- 
tellect and will) might henceforth rule and dictate behavior 
consistent with its will, was an arbitrary one made by God before 
Creation. Those alone can come to God whom he calls, and these 
are the ones "whom he has foreordained, purposed, promised, 
elected and predestinated."13 "For what he has determined and 
promised in the future, depends not on the will of men, but on 
his own power and choice."14 Those whom God has thus chosen 
cannot resist his grace.18 Colet defines grace as "divine mercy," 
the love which is infused into man by the Holy Spirit so that men 
will love him in return.16 Colet7s position is simply that apart 
from grace man has no free will either in the sense of power to 
choose holiness or in the sense of capacity to implement choice. 
A few years later Luther was to enunciate the same doctrine. 
The man whose will is thus bound was described by Colet in 
Neo-Platonic terms as the victim of "multiplicity." He is enslaved 
by the multiple urges of his fleshly self. Justification was defined 
by Colet as reconciliation with God which renders possible a con- 
solidation in "unity."17 The three steps in restoration to unity are 
hope, faith, and love (in that order). Hope engenders purifica- 
tion, unity, existence, and power; faith results in light, intellect, 
=Colet, Romans, p. 5. 
l2 Ibid., pp. 27, 32, 34, 37-38. 
"I bbid., p. 37. 
l4 Ibid., p. 38. 
l5 Ibid., p. 10; Miles, p. 92. 
l6 Miles, p. 92. 
l7 Hunt, pp. 110-111. 
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and knowledge; and love motivates heart, will, and goodness.18 
The establishment of these three qualities in the soul results in 
man's restoration to his genuinely authentic selfhood. 
We may conclude therefore, that by hope we have existence; 
by faith, knowledge; and by love, goodness; and that in thqse 
three consist the life and growth of the soul, whereby it lives, 
and has being, knowledge, and love of God; whereby it stands, 
and preserves and sustains itself; whereby also it reigns-in the 
body and binds it in obedience to itself; whereby, in a word, 
the whole man is good, beautiful, and happy.ls 
Miles traces the epistemological tradition by which purifi- 
cation (hope ) was a prelude to knowledge (faith). Plato, Paul, 
~ugustine, and Dionysius substantially agree that the first 
infused grace produces purifi~ation.~~ To Colet, the knowledge 
which results from faith is beyond natural reason. I t  is a mystical 
knowledge, "a kind of light infused into the soul of man from the 
divine sun, by which the heavenly verities are known to be 
revealed without uncertainty or doubt; and it as far excels the 
light of reason, as certainty does ~ncer ta inty ."~~ l i s  mystic 
knowledge, resulting from union with the divine, is the 
only true wisdom, as far as Colet is concerned. It can be 
'"received and delivered by those who were utterly devoid of 
the dark wisdom that consists in human reason."22 It is wisdom 
"only from God in C h r i ~ t . " ~ ~  
Colet and Philosophy 
, Despite Colet's insistence that authentic knowledge and wisdom 
are available only to the believer who has entered into a mystic 
union with God's Son, he recognizes that the other two sources 
Is Colet, Romans, p. 62; cf. Sears Jayne, John Colet and Marsilio Ficiuo 
(London, 1963), p. 65. 
l8 Colet, Romans, p. 62. 
Miles, pp. 124-126. 
=Ibid., p. 130. 
John Colet, An Exposition of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, 
trans. J .  H. Lupton (Farnborough, Hants., IEng., 1874, 1965), p. 19. Hereinafter 
referred to as Colet, Corinthians. 
lbid., p. 11. 
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of knowledge identified by Neo-Platonism are valid, even if to 
a much lesser degree. "Men are taught by God in three ways . . . 
by his sensible creation, by his spiritual and angelic creation; 
and by His Son.'"* Even though he rejected the natural theology 
of the scholastics, Colet was prepared to concede that the visible 
universe is a source of very limited understanding of ultimate 
truth and wisdom.25 According to Miles, Colet's authorities for this 
were Paul ( Rom 1 :20) and Plato ( Laws 12 : 967, 968). 
It is true that Colet regarded the Bible as the one ultimate 
standard of In this he was in accord with the 16th-century 
Reformers. Eugene F. Rice argues that Colet entirely repudiated 
philosophy as a source of Rice refers to the three positions 
on the question of faith and reason outlined by W ~ l f s o n . ~ ~  First 
is the double-faith theory in which true faith is acceptance of 
Scripture with or without the assistance of philosophy. Second 
is the single-faith theory by which a rational approach to 
Scripture utilizes the aid of philosophy. Third is the authoritarian 
single-faith theory which requires acceptance of Scripture without 
any help from philosophy. Rice is convinced that Colet adhered 
to the single-faith theory of the authoritarian variety, Hunt agrees: 
The Bible held the whole truth. That was Colet's conviction. 
"In the choice and well-stored table of Holy Scripture all things 
are contained that belong to the truth." So convinced was he 
of the all-sufficiency of the Bible that he discouraged the use of 
pagan authors as an aid to the understanding of it. "Now if any 
should say, as is often said, that reading pagan authors helps us to 
understand the Holy Scriptures, let them consider whether the 
fact of placing such reliance on them does not make them 
an obstacle to such understanding. In so doing you distrust your 
ability to understand the Scriptures by grace alone and prayer, 
and by the aid of Christ and of faith." And so he urges that "those 
Miles, p. 122 
" Ibid., pp. 122-123, 143. 
%Hunt, p. 62. 
nEugene F. Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," 
HTR 45 (July 1952): 152. 
28 Ibid. 
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books alone ought to be read in which there is a salutary flavour 
of Christ; in which Christ is set forth for us to feed upon."28 
Miles, Cassirer, and Jayne disagree with Rice, Hunt, and Hyma 
on this question of Colet's willingness (or unwillingness) to use 
philosophy as a handmaiden to theology. Miles and Cassirer 
refer to Colet's opinion that one who bears the true spirit of 
Christ is far more a Christian than one who has never heard of 
him.30 Miles cites Colet's statement in his exposition of Romans : 
"The Gentiles had for their guidance philosophers who were 
taught by observation of nature; the Jews had prophets who were 
taught by the angels; and lastly we Christians have Apostles, 
who were fully taught by Jesus."31 Miles is convinced that Colet 
recognized various means used by God throughout history to 
reveal truth. Colet rejected Ficino's and Cusa's universalism, 
staunchly maintaining that God's media of revelation are distinctly 
superior. Only Christians can receive the "full truth." But "Colet 
intermittently takes the position to which Augustine finally came, 
namely, that Greek (and Jewish) philosophy, while inferior, con- 
tain some degree of truth, and can be accepted and used wherever 
they are verified by, or at least do not conflict with, Christian 
authority."32 Hence Miles sees Colet as standing somewhere 
between Tertullian's unequivocal rejection of philosophy and 
the radical humanism of the Florentine Neo-Platoni~ts.~~ This 
is tantamount to placing Colet, on this question, squarely within 
the Clementine-Augustinian tradition. 
Jayne bolsters Miles' argument.34 His study of Colet's annota- 
tions in the margins of Ficino's Ephtolae has emphasized that 
Colet was interested in Platonism mainly in the years at Oxford. 
He found it a fruitful source of material for his theological lectures 
29 Hunt, p. 102. 
30 Miles, p. 23; Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance 
Philosophy (New York, 1963), p. 77; Colet, Romans, pp. 87-88. 
Ibid., citing Colet, Romans. 
32 Ibid., p. 24. 
33 Ibid., p, 30. 
34 Jayne, pp. 77-78. 
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on the Bible. Although he rejected Ficino's speculative, intellec- 
tual approach, he incorporated many Platonic and Neo-Platonic 
features into his lectures. Insofar as Platonism seemed consistent 
with Paul, Colet used it even though in certain key issues there 
was, in fact, a significant contradiction between the two sources. 
Jayne pertinently remarks, "Colet would obviously not have re- 
vived a school if he had not believed that moral training involves 
intellectual discipline."35 
Was Colet a Humanist? 
Rice takes great pains to convince us that John Colet was not a 
humanist.36 He presents two main arguments. First Colet held 
the traditional medieval Augustinian concept of wisdom as divine 
knowledge, rather than the classical view of wisdom as natural 
human perfection, an active commitment of virtue. I t  was towards 
this latter definition that Renaissance humanism tended. Second, 
Colet accepted only revelation as the means of achieving wis- 
dom, whereas the Renaissance humanists exalted reason as its pri- 
mary source. In regard to the first point, it is interesting to consider 
the classical definitions of wisdom which Rice gives in his book 
The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom. Plato, for example, said that 
wisdom was a contemplation of eternal, immutable, and intelli- 
gible Ideas; and Aristotle defined wisdom as a knowledge of the 
first causes and principles of things and called it a "divine 
science."37 Rice prefers to accept as the classical definition of 
wisdom that held by Cicero and Seneca: a moral vktue which is 
an imitation of reason and nature. This concept Charron accepted, 
and hence he was a true Renaissance humanist. It seems not 
inappropriate to point out that if we were to accept the definition 
of wisdom given by the two most influential classical philosophers, 
Colet would have to be regarded as considerably more a humanist 
than Charron. 
=Ibid., p. 78. 
86Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," p. 142; cf. Eugene 
F. Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 19-29. 
a7 Rice, Renaissance Idea of Wisdom, p. 1. 
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Sears Jayne rejects Rice's contention that Colet's concept of 
wisdom was essentially contemplative and, therefore, subversive 
of the Renaissance human, ethical, and moral bias.38 Colet, he 
says, was a voluntarist. His concern was moral action and ethical 
reform. Whereas Ficino emphasized the intellectual faculty of 
the soul, Colet emphasized its moral faculty.39 It was the good 
works which the regenerated man could do through the power of 
the Holy Spirit that Colet consistently extolled.40 If Rice should 
object that Renaissance humanism exalted the efficiency of man's 
free will in the ethical enterprise, by contrast with Colet's an- 
nihilation of free will, the answer could be given that Colet 
considered the regenerated will as decidedly e f fe~ t ive .~~  The 
doctrine of faith formed by love, to which Colet gave credence, 
allowed for a certain distinct autonomy of will after justification. 
Rice's second suggestion, that true Renaissance humanism em- 
ployed human reason as the primary means of attaining wisdom, 
in contrast to Colet's reliance upon revelation, would appear to 
be a serious e~aggerat ion.~~ It  is not entirely true, for example, as 
Rice says, that "for Erasmus the insights of wisdom are natural 
products of the human reason."43 As we shall see in the next 
section, Erasmus too had considerable respect for revelation as 
a source of wisdom. As indicated above, Colet did give some 
credence to the insights of philosophy. If a humanist must be one 
who accepts only the presumed classical means of achieving 
wisdom, i.e., natural reason, there can be no such thing as 
Christian humanism. We would be in the invidious position of 
having to exclude such great Christian scholars as Erasmus 
and Melanchthon from the humanist camp. 
Perhaps it is more correct to define a humanist as one who 
Jayne, pp. 70-73. 
39 Ibid., p. 73. 
40 Colet, Corinthians, pp. 32, 129, 139-140, 142-143. 
41 Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," p. 148. 
Ibid., pp. 145, 147. 
Ibid., p. 146. 
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acknowledged some place for human intellect and reason in the 
study of human behavior and its causes, and sometimes in the 
critical study of Christian sources (Scripture, the Fathers, 
philosophy), but not in the dialectical investigation of first causes 
and the nature of absolute truth. If this is correct, both the secu- 
larists and the revelationists can be included. Colet does not com- 
pletely divest human intellect of insight into matters human. 
Nor does he regard philosophy as completely devoid of truth con- 
sistent with the Christian message. He does not, however, go so far 
as Luther, who regarded philosophy as decidedly harmful and 
advised against its use." Hence we may justifiably regard Colet 
as a humanist. 
2. Eramnus of Rotterdam 
In his article ''John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," 
Rice describes the gap between Colet's theology and Eras- 
mus' humanism as similar to that between Erasmus and 
Luther.45 He says that the medieval Augustinian tradition, of 
which Colet was a part, differs from humanism in that it con- 
tinued to define sapientia in terms of Christian revelation. "It is 
precisely this disassociation of wisdom and revelation which is 
the novel element in the humanist conception of ~apientia."~~ 
Hence the humanist definition of wisdom is closer to the Cicer- 
onian. Rice presents Erasmus and Conrad Celtis as typical repre- 
sentatives of the trend. They wished to invest wisdom with much 
of its old ethical and scientific meaning. For Celtis sapientia 
involves "a love of astronomical and physical in~estigation."~~ 
Rice fails to indicate the distinction between Celtis and Erasmus 
on the question of science. Speaking of Erasmus, Preserved Smith 
explains : 
Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia, 1963, 1966), 
pp. 4, 9-11; cf. William M. Landeen, Martin Luther's Religious Thought 
(Mountain View, California, 1971), p. 89. 
&Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," pp. 141-163. 
46 Ibid., p. 145. 
47 Ibid. 
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Then, again, he had no interest in science. While Leonardo 
was experimenting in anatomy and physics and accumulating 
facts about geology and astronomy, while Copernicus was working 
out the most momentous discovery that has ever dawned upon 
the human mind, while Vives, who was well known to Erasmus, 
was stating that men should no longer rely on authority but 
should look at nature for themselves, the attitude of Erasmus 
was intensely conservative. Like Socrates, he not only did not 
care for natural science, he actively disliked it as leading men's 
thoughts away from the more important problems of moral 
philosophy.& 
Rice indicates that Erasmus shared Celtis' ethical concept of 
wisdom. This is the emphasis, he says, in the Enchiridion Militis 
Chr i~ t ian i .~~  Even though Rice recognizes that Erasmus found in 
Christ the ultimate source of wisdom, it was wisdom resulting 
from an imitation of his virtues rather than from acceptance of 
revelation. "For Erasmus the insights of wisdom are natural 
products of the human reason."50 Erasmus promised immortality 
to the follower of Ciceronian ethics.51 He emphasized antique 
virtue as sufficient for salvation. "The rigid identification of 
sapientia with revelation gradually gives way to a @sea sapientia 
whose primary source is the natural reason of the classical 
moralists. Colet classified wisdom under faith and illumination; 
Erasmus and Celtis under reason and h~mani tas ."~~ 
In order to test the validity of Rice's assertions we need to in- 
vestigate further the questions he discusses. First, what was 
Erasmus' concept of wisdom? Was it wholly human and ethical 
or was there a revelational element? Second, what were the means 
emphasized by Erasmus, with which man might achieve wisdom? 
Did all depend on human intellect and will or was there a 
distinctly divine ingredient? 
48Preserved Smith, Erasmus: A Study of His Life, Ideals, and Phce in 
History (New York, 1923, 1962), p. 35. 
4BRice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural." p. 145. 
60 Ibid., p. 146. 
Ibid. 
6a Ibid., p. 147. 
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Eramnus' Concept of Wisdom; the "Philosophia Christi" 
According to Lewis W. Spitz, even though Erasmus' Praise of 
Folly at times sounds like Ovid and Cicero, who saw in nature 
and reason the source of good ethical conduct, the more pre- 
dominant motif is, in fact, the true sapientiu "which comes from 
above and which can best be learned from the Wisdom incarnate. 
Erasmus does not stand on naturalistic ground, antique or 
modern."53 Similar ambivalence is evident in Erasmus' colloquy, 
"The Epicurean." The best things in life are enjoyed to the 
full by the religious man. Indeed, Christ was the greatest 
philosopher and the leading Epicurean. Nevertheless, Christian 
piety is linked with the transcendent God, and union with him, 
rendering possible release from the limitations of nature, is man's 
highest good.54 
There is an undoubted ethical emphasis in the Emhiridion. 
The virtue of the Stoics and the probity of the Christians are 
spoken of as wisdom.55 But the ultimate revelational nature of 
wisdom is very much in evidence. 
On the other hand, the author of wisdom-rather, Wisdom 
itself-is Christ Jesus, who is the true light, the only light dispel- 
ling the light of worldly folly; the radiance of His Father's glory 
who, according to Paul, was made our wisdom when He became 
the redemption and justification for us who have been reborn in 
Him . . . and following His example, we can overcome our 
enemy, wickedness, if only we are wise in Him, in whom we 
shall conquer. . . . For, as Paul says, in the eyes of God there 
is no more profound folly than worldly wisdom: it must be 
unlearned by one who wishes to be truly wise.% 
Erasmus worked for the rebirth of letters ( renascentes litterae), 
and a restitution of Christianity ( restitutw Christianismi ) .57 
Lewis W. Spitz, The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 207-208. 
" Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
66Raymond Himelick, trans., The Enchiridion of Erasmus (Bloomington, 
Ind., 1963), p. 59. 
Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
" Spitz, pp. 203-204. 
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Christianity could be restored only by attention to its earliest 
literary sources. In the preface to his Greek New Testament he 
urged renewed attention to the commandments of the Founder 
of the Faith, to evangelical and apostolic sources.58 The reform 
which he had in mind involved a critical use of the Scriptures, 
Church Fathers, and bonae l i t t e t ~ e . ~ ~  The term he gave to the 
resultant world-view was "philosophia Christi." Both Agricola and 
Abelard had used the term before him. It described an eclectic 
Christian philosophy of the kind advocated by Justin Martyr who 
in the 2d century A.D. wrote his two apologies and the Dialogue 
with Tryphoa60 Erasmus thought it much worse for a Christian 
to be ignorant of Christ's teaching than for Aristotelians to be 
ill-informed as to the true teachings of Aristotle. The Stoics, 
Epicureans, Socrates, and Aristotle taught truths which were 
later reiterated by Christ; but he taught them best, and perfectly 
practised what he preached. J. Huizinga concludes that Erasmus' 
classicism "only serves him as a form, and from antiquity he only 
chooses those elements which in ethical tendency are in con- 
formity with his Christian ideal."G1 
The Means of Achieving Wisdom 
It is not true, in Smith's estimation, that there was no mystical 
ingredient in the piety of Erasmus, that it was all ethical.62 The 
influence of the Brethren of the Common Life stayed with him and 
imparted a recognition of the role of the spirit. From the 
Florentine Platonic Academy Erasmus derived much of his 
lespect for Greek philosophy and for the right of reason.63 His 




61 Johann Huizinga, Erasmus and the Age of  Reformation (New York, 1924, 
1957). 
82Smith, pp. 52-53. 
a Ibid. 
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revelation and reason were linked in somewhat tenuous co- 
existence.64 
Although Erasmus sometimes divided man into the threefold 
division of body, soul, and spirit, usually he spoke of only the two 
components, body and spirit.65 The two main powers of the spirit 
were understanding and will. He related faith to understanding 
and love to will. Faith was a "cognitive principle for spiritual 
tr~ths."~6 Understanding and knowledge are essential to faith. 
Faith is not primarily an existential experience for Erasmus. 
This is why in the Enchridion he offers knowledge as one of the 
two vital weapons for the Christian. The other is prayer.67 The 
three sources of knowledge which he stressed are Scripture, the 
early-church Fathers, and the philosophers. 
For Erasmus, the Scriptures were paramount as the source of 
truth.68 His exegetical method called for the use of intellect and 
reason. It was the historical-grammatical method, which employs 
both literary and textual criticism. His work on the Greek text of 
the New Testament and the Greek and Latin Fathers earned him 
the reputation of being a founder of modern textual criticism. But 
he favored the allegorical method of interpretation by which hid- 
den meanings are looked for beneath the superficial and the 
literal.69 
In respect to philosophy, Erasmus rejected Scholasticism out of 
hand. In his Ratio verae theologkze, he contrasts the theology of 
the scholastics with that of Origen, Basil, and Jerorne.'O The 
older theology he likens to a golden river, the scholastic to a small 
rivulet which has been polluted. On the other hand, pagan 
authors should be studied. The philosophy of the Greeks com- 
a Ibid. 
%Roland H. Bainton, Erasmzs of Christendom (New York, 1969), pp. 60-61. 
ffi Spitz, pp. 231-232. 
07 Himelick, pp. 47-48. 
John C. Olin, ed., Luther, Erasmus and the Reformation: a Catholic- 
Protestant Reappraisal (New York, 1969), p. 102. 
69 Himelick, p. 53. 
70 Ibid., p. 213. (See Erasmus, Opera Omnia, 592.) 
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prised a kind of natural gospel.71 The classics were Erasmus' 
source for his conception of humanitas as virtue, morality, and 
integrity in the Roman sense.72 In fact, he was prepared to credit 
some of the classical writers with a measure of inspiration. In 
the colloquy, "The Godly Feast," Erasmus puts these words into 
the mouth of Eusebius: 
On the contrary, whatever is devout and contributes to good 
morals should not be called profane. Of course, Sacred Scripture 
is the basic authority in everything; yet I sometimes run across 
ancient sayings or pagan writings-even the poets'-so purely 
and reverently expressed, and so inspired, that I can't help 
believing their authors' hearts were moved by some divine power. 
And perhaps the spirit of Christ is more widespread than we 
understand, and the company of saints includes many not in our 
calendar. Speaking frankly among friends, I can't read Cicero's 
De senectute, De amicitia, De oficiis, De Tuscdanis quaestionibus 
without sometimes kissing the book and blessing that pure heart, 
divinely inspired as it was.73 
The real point seems to be, not that Erasmus attempted to 
separate faith and reason, as Rice would have us believe, but 
that he sought to draw reason into the realm of faith, in the sense 
that he used philosophy, not as a handmaiden of theology, but as 
a rational contributor to that instructed faith which he saw as 
vital to the good life. 
Erasmus' Concept of the Will 
In his Discourse on Free Will ( 1524), Erasmus defended two 
main theses: (1) that the doctrine of absolute necessity in all 
happenings is false, and ( 2 )  that the free will of man can a c  
complish something. Grace is essential, but man's will is free to 
choose the good and to co-operate with grace. In relation to the 
first point, Erasmus rejected the teachings of Colet and Luther 
on the question of predestination. Colet, as we have seen, 
identified or "coalesced" God's foreknowledge and predestination 
71 Smith, p. 34. 
Spitz, p. 21 1. 
Erasmus, Ten Colloquies, trans. Craig R. Thompson (New York, 1957), 
p. 155. 
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in the case of the saved. Both Colet and Luther, with some shade 
of difference, looked upon the will of the justified man as 
not being the cause of his justification; rather, God's arbitrary 
predetermination was the cause. Erasmus saw God's foreknowl- 
edge as compatible with human freedom of choice. "Fore- 
knowledge," he said, "does not cause what is to take place. Even 
we know many things which will be happening. They will not 
happen because we know them, but vice versa."74 Bainton brands 
this argument as specious: 
There can be sure foreknowledge only of that which is 
definitely fixed. A man can, of course, foresee that which he has not 
foreordained, but if there is only one God, there is no other on 
whom to lay the responsibility for the predetermination. A single 
omnipotent and omniscient God can foreknow only what He has 
foreordained. Luther insisted on this squarely. And he was 
convinced that he understood the mind of 
Perhaps Erasmus was more Pauline than Bainton suggests. In 
Rom 8:29, 30 predestination of those "to be conformed to the 
image of his Son" comes after foreknowledge, and the call comes 
after the predestination. In Rom 9, the crucial chapter over 
which Luther and Erasmus argued so bitterly, God is not 
spoken of as predetermining the faith of the spiritual seed of 
Abraham, but rather the fulfillment of the promise to those 
foreknown to have faith. It would seem highly possible that an 
omnipotent and omniscient God could foreordain that his human 
creatures should have freedom of choice. Of course, if they chose 
evil, God could be blamed for granting them such freedom. But 
since he exercised his omnipotence to the extent of refraining 
from coercion in either direction, man is responsible for the 
results of his own choice. 
This was precisely Erasmus7 point. After the Fall and before 
the gift of special grace, human reason, intellect, and will were 
74Er11st F. Winter, trans. & ed., Erasmus-Luther Discourse on Free Will 
(New York, 1961), p. 49. 
75 Bainton, p. 190. 
COLET, ERASMUS, AND MONTAIGNE 49 
weak but not entirely extinct.76 By free will before grace, 
Erasmus meant freedom to choose either good or eviLT7 Whether 
he credited man's will with the capacity to implement the choice 
before grace is a moot point. He claimed that "they had a will 
tending to moral good, but incapable of eternal salvation, unless 
grace be added through faith."'8 Again and again he asserted 
man's incapacity to perform good works apart from grace.7g 
This rather tends to weaken respect for his favorite classical 
authors who were not Christians. Hence he adds: 
The fact remains that there have been philosophers who 
possessed some knowledge of God, and hence perhaps also some 
trust and love of God, and did not act solely out of vainglory's 
sake, but rather out of love of virtue and goodness, which, 
they taught, was to be loved for no other reason but that it  is 
good.80 
Erasmus told Thomas More that if it were not for Paul's 
authority to the contrary, he would have been inclined to believe 
that man by his natural powers could earn the lesser merit 
( meriturn de congruo ) . 
After the reception of grace, Erasmus thought, reason is 
restored and will is strengthened to c ~ o p e r a t e . ~ ~  "Thus faith 
heals our reason which has suffered through sin, and charity 
helps our weakened will to act."82 By means of this "operative" 
grace man is capable of performing ethically good works which 
render him an eligible applicant for "ultimate" grace by which 
sin is finally and irrevocably e r a d i ~ a t e d . ~ ~  The recipients of 
"operative" grace are, therefore, able to "trust in their own 
works."84 Here is the semi-Pelagian element in Erasmus' theology. 
%Winter, p. 22. 
77 Ibid., pp. 22-23, 25-26, 29-80. 
Ibid., p. 24. 
Ibid., pp. 22-24. 
Ibid., p. 28. 
Bainton, pp. 188- 189. 
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After reception of "operative" grace, man has now both the 
freedom of choice and a certain capacity to earn merit by the 
implementation of the choice. Colet substantially agreed. Luther 
vehemently disagreed, recognizing neither free choice nor an 
independent power of cooperation with grace. Significantly, 
Melanchthon rejected predestination and took a position some- 
where between Erasmus and Luther on the question of the 
He agreed with Erasmus that before grace man has freedom to 
choose. The power to implement the choice is available ordy 
after grace, but the works are works of faith, not works of 
meritorious cooperation. On this latter point he agreed with 
Luther against Erasmus. Perhaps, in the final analysis, Melanch- 
thon can be regarded as more Pauline than Colet, Luther, or 
Erasmus. 
I t  is strikingly evident that Erasmus did not regard the primary 
sources of wisdom as natural reason, the classical moralists, and 
the autonomous exercise of the will in the direction of ethical 
goodness-despite Rice's insistence to the contrary. Nor did 
Erasmus promise immortality to the follower of Ciceronian 
ethics. In fact, revelation and grace are very basic to the 
Erasmian system of thought. If Rice's definition of a humanist 
were correct, Erasmus would not qualify. 
3. Montaigne 
Montaigne as a Humanist 
Philip P. Hallie furnishes us with a definition of a humanist 
which "fits Montaigne like a glove" but which, when applied to 
the other personalities discussed in this essay and my previous 
one, fits only where it touches.S6 The humanists were those 
scholars concerned with grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and 
moral philosophy. The only "philosophy" of the humanists was 
" Clyde Leonard Manschreck, Melanchthon the Quiet Reformer (New York, 
1958), pp. xiii, 60-63. 
Philip P. Hallie, T h e  Scar of Montaigne: an Essay in Personal Philosophy 
(Middletown, 1966), pp. 9- 10. 
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moral philosophy. Their special interest did not include logic, 
the natural sciences, metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy, 
medicine, law, and theology. "A humanist is somebody more 
interested (via his interest in antiquity) in ways of using language 
and of living than he is in knowledge of the conclusions of such 
fields as physics, mathematics, or theology."s7 The humanists 
rejected the Scholastic quest for God. "They were not interested 
in what was external to man, nor were they interested in the 
externals of men."88 They sought to understand "the ways men 
encounter various subjects, the ways they engage in their various 
occupations, the ways they live in their various stations."8g 
Hallie offers Erasmus, along with Montaigne, as a prime ex- 
ample of his definition. He spares us Rice's emphasis on auto- 
nomous reason as the humanist means of achieving wisdom, 
presumably because this would not fit Montaigne. But his 
definition does not fit Cusa, Colet, or Erasmus. As we have seen, 
these three did not make any radical separation of the realm 
of faith from the realm of reason and will. There was a distinct 
theocentric element in the thought of Cusa, Colet, and Erasmus. 
"Philosophia Christi" does not fit comfortably into Hallie's 
definition. 
On the other hand, the idea presented by Rice, that the 
humanists exalted man in relation to the cosmos, extolling the 
independent potential of his intellectual and voluntarist powers, 
does not apply to Montaigne. He deemphasized man's ascendancy 
in the universe, taking the Skeptic view that he is not the ruler 
over the rest of creation but is on "the same footing" as the 
animals.s0 As an orthodox Skeptic following the lead of Sextus 
Empiricus, Montaigne valued life according to nature.D1 By 
"nature" he did not mean the laws of nature discovered by 
Ibid., p. 10. 
=Ibid., 15. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 31. 
Ibid., pp. 32, 49. 
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human reason alone. He meant "the passions . . . whereby hunger 
drives us to food and thirst to drink."92 In other words, "nature" 
has reference to the drives which are characteristically experi- 
enced by both men and animals. 
Moreover, what sort of faculty of ours do we not recognize 
in the actions of the animals? Is there a society regulated with 
more order, diversified into more charges and functions, and 
, more consistently maintained, than that of the honeybees? Can 
we imagine so orderly an arrangement of actions and occupations 
as this to be conducted without reason and fore~ight?"~ 
This is a salient motif in the "Apology of Raymond Sebond." 
If Colet demoted human reason by subordinating it to grace, 
Montaigne devalued it by asserting its inability to arrive at  any 
certain truth whether in the philosophical or the natural realm. 
Rice's contention that for the humanist "the insights of wisdom 
are natural products of the human reason,"s4 excludes Montaigne 
from the humanist fraternity. On the other hand, the definition of 
a humanist provided in this essay-as one who acknowledges some 
place for human intellect and reason in the study of human 
behavior and its causes-allows for the inclusion of Montaigne. 
Obviously, his reason was not dormant in the recognition of the 
endless variety of beliefs, customs, and standards in the world and 
the acceptance of the provinciality of his own mores. His point 
was that "we have no other test of truth and reason than the 
example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country 
we live in."95 Reason does have some place in his system, but not 
for the discovery of unequivocal truths, not as the source of 
wisdom. 
Montaigne's S ke pticisrn 
Skepticism was a large ingredient in Montaigne's personal 
philosophy. He maintained that Skepticism rescues the mind 
" Ibid., p. 32. 
83 Donald M. Frame, trans., The Complete Essays of Montaigne (Stanford, 
Cal., 1958), p. 332. 
=Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," p. 146. 
95 Hallie, p. 19. 
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from the sea of doubt and anxiety associated with the search for 
philosophical c e r t i t ~ d e . ~ ~  As a Skeptic he rejected metaphysical 
laws as well as any concept of natural law underlying the positive 
laws of a nation.97 The laws, customs and beliefs of any society 
he regarded as local and relative.98 His motive for accepting the 
mores of his own society was expediential, not metaphysical or 
His concern was his own "health," which he defined 
as the psychological peace resulting from orientation to the 
accepted order of society, with minimal concern for any special- 
ized knowledge of man and the cosmos.100 But "health" was more 
than that. It involved toleration of other people's ideas and ways 
of doing things. "In fact, for him, health and the recognition of 
variety in the world are much the same thing."lol This life in 
accordance with health is life in conformity to the "Practical 
Criterion."lo2 Montaigne is categorized as a moderate Catholic 
and a "Politique" because his acceptance of the Practical 
Criterion rendered him tolerant of any religious or political 
world-view.lo3 In this regard his philosophy was to "live and 
let live." 
As a Skeptic, Montaigne rejected "Indicative Signs," defined 
as dialectical proofs of the Absolute, but also as hidden "sub- 
stances" or "laws" or "essences."104 "Recollective Signs," which 
refer to experience that relates to other parts of experience, he 
accepted as valid. He held that "no one claim about facts beyond 
experience is in the end more certain (or uncertain) than any 
other."lo5 Indicative Signs (antitheses) could be very numerous. 
" Ibid., p. 23. 
87 Ibid., p. 24. 
n8 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Montaigne tolerated them all, but he dignified none of them 
as truth.1°6 
Montaigne's philosophy implies the relativity of all scientific 
knowledge. He spoke of the very real possibility of Copernicus 
being replaced by some other astronomer who would upset his 
theories. Since there are no eternal guarantees of truth, fashions 
of thought will come and go.lo7 "In short, the truth of our im- 
pressions is relative to ourselves; there may be as many different 
kinds of truths as there are different kinds of animals. As for 
the independent, essential nature of objects 'behind' those impres- 
sions these conflicting impressions and effects lead us to suspend 
judgment."108 
Acceptance of religious, political and cultural custom was not 
a contradiction of Montaigne's subjective philosophy, but was 
rather a part of it. He did not put religion into one compartment of 
his existence and the Skeptic's life according to nature into another 
compartment. Religious conformity and tolerance for the sake 
of peace and "health was adjustment to the real situation of life. 
It was not based on the conviction of the truth of religious 
propositions but on the practical expedient of "hunting with the 
pack." It was dictated by the Practical Criterion. 
Since, as a Skeptic, Montaigne identified no universal truths 
which are valid for all men, his humanism was not likely to be- 
come the kind of educative program envisioned by Erasmus and 
Melanchthon. His philosophy amounts to this: Do your own thing 
within the context of the demands of your own society. 
. . . Montaigne ususally spoke not in terms of "us" but in 
terms of me, this particular man, with this particular name-a 
particular man whose particular yearnings and insights and 
impulses overflowed the categories or methods of any school?09 
lW Ibid., p. 29. 
lW Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
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The Apology of Raymond Sebond 
The essay, the "Apology of Raymond Sebond," effectively illus- 
trates Montaigne's understanding of the intellect-will problem. 
The essay was written between 1575 and 1580 as a defence of 
Sebond's natural theology. It is a Skeptical essay written to defend 
an orthodox Catholic theologian.l1° Montaigne attempts to disarm 
both Sebond and his opponents so as to demonstrate the weak- 
ness of human reason. 
One objection to Sebond's dialectical arguments, which Mon- 
taigne regards as somewhat mild, is that matters of faith are 
separate from matters of reason and, therefore, Sebond's dialec- 
tical enterprise was fruitless.lll Montaigne has two answers. First, 
although reason provides no ontological proof, it has consider- 
able psychological value for the believer. I t  proves nothing, but 
bolsters the attitude of faith.l12 Second, faith cannot be separated 
from things human. It is always conditioned by the subject who 
adheres to it. Grace is never undefiled by the human recipient.l13 
Otherwise, everyone would believe the same way and there would 
be no variety. At first sight, this seems inconsistent with Mon- 
taigne's ultimate appeal to revelation and grace. 
For to make the handful bigger than the hand, the armful 
bigger than the arm, and to hope to straddle more than the reach 
of our legs, is impossible and unnatural. Nor can man raise him- 
self above himself and humanity; for he can see only with his own 
eyes, and seize only with his own grasp. He will rise, if God by 
exception lends him a hand; he will rise by abandoning and 
renouncing his own means, and letting himself be raised and 
uplifted by purely celestial means. It  is for our Christian faith, 
not for his Stoical virtue, to aspire to that divine and miraculous 
metamorph~sis?~~ 
What is the use of revelation and grace if there is no universally 
valid perception of it? Why does Montaigne talk about the divine 
Ibid., p. 38. 
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lUIbid., p. 41. 
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at all if the apprehension of it is so individualized and fragmented? 
He speaks elsewhere of the Fideist's simple faith in God as one of 
the sources of stability and peace. But in Montaigne's view this is 
a highly subjective experience which is culturally, psychologically, 
and biologically determined. Revelation in any ultimate sense is 
rejected. Because it is received by a particular subject, it is 
distorted by subjective experience. Therefore revelation, like 
reason, is unable to result in any certain and unvarying truth. 
"He will not try to distinguish the ray of divinity from the 
human being who 'lodges' it in his mind; he will simply look 
at the whole man."l15 Since each and every individual experience 
is valid, we should be tolerant to all. This is different from 
Nicholas of Cusa's universalism because it is based on a slightly 
different premise. Nicholas says that there is some of the same 
ultimate truth in all men. Therefore a universal religion should 
be possible. Montaigne says that the divine ray is diffused dif- 
ferently in each man. Therefore religious unity is unrealistic. 
Tolerance is the watch-word. 
Montaigne prized complete, untrammeled freedom of the will. 
His thought on this question was in no way determined by 
metaphysical or theological considerations. Freedom, however, 
was not of the antinomian variety. It  involved easy-going con- 
formity to customary law and the pressures of habit and tradi- 
tion.l16 Although his public life made demands upon him contrary 
to the dictates of his free will and conscience, he attempted to 
fulfill his obligations to society while maintaining an unswerving 
loyalty to his unique authentic selfhood.l17 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
The new approach to matters divine led the Northern humanists 
discussed in this and my previous essay to new conclusions 
Hallie, p. 43. 
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about man and his ethical capacities and responsibilities. Nicholas 
of Cusa asserted that natural reason cannot find out God. 
Intellect is "detained in ignorance" apart from grace, and will is 
impotent apart from ,Christ. But both intellect and will are 
activated and empowered by a mystical union with the Divine. 
This was no radical separation of faith and reason but a redefini- 
tion of the relationship between faith-grace and intellect-will. 
That Cusa respected the use of natural reason in the natural realm 
is demonstrated by his interest in mathematics, astronomy, and 
history. 
John Colet made a distinction between intellect, which after 
reception of grace apprehends God, and that reasonable capacity 
by which man studies the phenomenal world. It is will in the 
realm of the spiritual, not will in the amoral affairs of daily life, 
which to Colet is in bondage apart from grace. As a voluntarist 
he saw regenerated will as effective in the area of morals and 
ethics. His system is, therefore, somewhat similar to that of Cusa. 
Erasmus gave a larger place to human intellect and will than did 
Colet and Cusa, but sought to draw reason into the area of faith 
by making it, along with revelation, a means to the ethically good 
life. Montaigne repudiated both reason and revelation as sources 
of unvarying truth in either the spiritual or the natural realms. 
Reason has psychological and homiletical value, and human will is 
entirely free. 
Therefore none of the four writers studied fits into Rice's 
definition of a humanist as one who sought by means of auto- 
nomous human intellect and will the natural human virtue which 
Cicero valued so highly. The tentative, alternative definition 
suggested here is that a Renaissance humanist was one who 
acknowledged some place for human intellect and reason in the 
study of human behavior and its causes, and sometimes also in 
the critical study of Christian sources (Scripture, the Fathers, 
philosophy), but not in the dialectical investigation of first causes 
and the nature of absolute truth. 
